Games, optimization and phase transitions

Johan Wästlund


Chalmers University of Technology

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Two-person games




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Talk at Les Houches, March 2010

Computer's perception of the position




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Random model: The Poisson Galton-Watson process


Random rooted tree. Each node has $Po(\lambda)$ -distributed # children.



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Random model: The Poisson Galton-Watson process

Random rooted tree. Each node has $Po(\lambda)$ -distributed # children.



Convention: A player unable to move loses.

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• Replica Symmetric ansatz: Someone must win (true for $\lambda \leq 1)$

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- Replica Symmetric ansatz: Someone must win (true for $\lambda \leq 1)$
- Let p = P(Bob wins under optimal play).

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
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
$$p=rac{W(\lambda)}{\lambda}.$$

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Talk at Les Houches, March 2010

Replica Symmetric ansatz





What happened?

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The "RS" solution $\lambda = \frac{-\log p}{p}$ is the *fixed-point* of the map

$$p\mapsto e^{-\lambda p}.$$


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The "RS" solution $\lambda = \frac{-\log p}{p}$ is the *fixed-point* of the map $p \mapsto e^{-\lambda p}$.

But the truth about the game comes from *iterating* that map.


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 $\lambda = 2.5.$

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
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 $\lambda = 2.5.$

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
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 $\lambda = 2.9.$

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
 $\lambda = 2.9.$

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Truncated game


• The iterates show Bob's probability of winning if the tree is truncated after *k* moves.



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Truncated game


- The iterates show Bob's probability of winning if the tree is truncated after *k* moves.
- If in reality the game is drawn, the parity of k will determine the winner of the truncated game.




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Truncated game

- The iterates show Bob's probability of winning if the tree is truncated after *k* moves.
- If in reality the game is drawn, the parity of k will determine the winner of the truncated game.
- Draw ↔ influence of boundary conditions remains positive



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• Algorithmic Combinatorial Game Theory

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- Algorithmic Combinatorial Game Theory
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- Algorithmic Combinatorial Game Theory
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- Algorithmic Combinatorial Game Theory
- Geography:

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• Letters = Nodes

- Algorithmic Combinatorial Game Theory
- Geography:

- Paris Stockholm Madrid Dublin New Delhi Islamabad Damascus Santiago Oslo...
- Letters = Nodes
- Cities = Directed Edges

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- Algorithmic Combinatorial Game Theory
- Geography: PSPACE complete (Schaefer 1978)

- Paris Stockholm Madrid Dublin New Delhi Islamabad Damascus Santiago Oslo...
- Letters = Nodes
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- Algorithmic Combinatorial Game Theory
- Geography: PSPACE complete (Schaefer 1978)
- Vertex Geography: PSPACE complete (Lichtensein-Sipser 1980)

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- Algorithmic Combinatorial Game Theory
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- Undirected Vertex Geography: P

- Paris Stockholm Madrid Dublin New Delhi Islamabad Damascus Santiago Oslo...
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Undirected Vertex Geography

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Undirected Vertex Geography

• General graph

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Undirected Vertex Geography

- General graph
- Alice and Bob take turns choosing the edges of a self-avoiding walk

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
Undirected Vertex Geography

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- Whoever gets stuck loses

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- Alice and Bob take turns choosing the edges of a self-avoiding walk
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- Why in P?

Theorem

On a finite graph, Alice wins if and only if every maximum size matching covers the starting point.




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Theorem


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
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On a finite graph, Alice wins if and only if every maximum size matching covers the starting point.



Erdös-Renyi random graph model

• N nodes

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Erdös-Renyi random graph model

- N nodes
- Each edge present with probability λ/N (average degree λ)

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Erdös-Renyi random graph model

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- Local weak limit: The Poisson Galton-Watson process (Poisson Bethe lattice)

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Erdös-Renyi random graph model

- N nodes
- Each edge present with probability λ/N (average degree λ)
- Local weak limit: The Poisson Galton-Watson process (Poisson Bethe lattice)
- If $N >> \lambda^{2k}$, then the *k*-neighborhood of a random vertex is a tree (whp)

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• In the ER-graph, add a random edge (u, v).

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$$P(\text{Bob wins})^2 = \frac{W(\lambda)^2}{\lambda^2}.$$

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Integrating: Proportion of vertices covered by max-size matching

$$=2-2rac{W(\lambda)}{\lambda}-rac{W(\lambda)^2}{\lambda}.$$

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• Ground state of a "physical" model:

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
• Ground state of a "physical" model: States = matchings,

 $H(\sigma) = \#$ unmatched vertices

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Minimum cost matching

• Complete graph K_N with $\exp(N)$ edge-costs.




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Minimum cost matching

- Complete graph K_N with exp(N) edge-costs.
- Minimum cost (near-) perfect matching?




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
Minimum cost matching

- Complete graph K_N with exp(N) edge-costs.
- Minimum cost (near-) perfect matching?
- Average cost per vertex = $\pi^2/12$ (Mézard-Parisi 1985, Aldous 2001)



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
Minimum cost matching



Johan Wästlund

Games, optimization and phase transitions

2-person zero-sum game:




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2-person zero-sum game:


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2-person zero-sum game:

- Alice and Bob take turns choosing edges of a self-avoiding walk
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2-person zero-sum game:

- Alice and Bob take turns choosing edges of a self-avoiding walk
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


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


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



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2-person zero-sum game:


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
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


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Graph Exploration

2-person zero-sum game:

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


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Graph Exploration

2-person zero-sum game:


- Alice and Bob take turns choosing edges of a self-avoiding walk
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- or terminate by paying $\lambda/2$ to the opponent
- Edges longer than λ are irrelevant!



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Diluted Matching Problem

Optimization:



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
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Diluted Matching Problem

Optimization:

• Partial matching




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Diluted Matching Problem

Optimization:

- Partial matching
- Cost = total length of edges + $\lambda/2$ for each unmatched vertex




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Diluted Matching Problem

Optimization:

- Partial matching
- Cost = total length of edges $+ \lambda/2$ for each unmatched vertex
- Feasible solutions exist also for odd *N*



Solution to Graph Exploration

• Fix λ and edge costs

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Solution to Graph Exploration

- Fix λ and edge costs
- M(G) = cost of diluted matching problem

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- $\bullet~{\rm Fix}~\lambda$ and edge costs
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- f(G, v) = Bob's payoff under optimal play from v

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Solution to Graph Exploration

- Fix λ and edge costs
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Lemma

$$f(G, v) = M(G) - M(G - v)$$

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Solution to Graph Exploration

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Solution to Graph Exploration

Lemma

$$f(G,v) = M(G) - M(G-v)$$

Proof.

$$f(G, v) = \min(\lambda/2, I_i - f(G - v, v_i))$$

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$$f(G, v) = \min(\lambda/2, I_i - f(G - v, v_i))$$

$$M(G) = \min(\lambda/2 + M(G - v), l_i + M(G - v - v_i))$$

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$$M(G) - M(G - v) = \min(\lambda/2, l_i - (M(G - v) - M(G - v - v_i)))$$

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
$$M(G) = \min(\lambda/2 + M(G - v), l_i + M(G - v - v_i))$$

$$M(G) - M(G - v) = \min(\lambda/2, l_i - (M(G - v) - M(G - v - v_i)))$$

$$f(G, v) \text{ and } M(G) - M(G - v) \text{ satisfy the same recursion.} \qquad \Box$$

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
Solution to Graph Exploration



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Tree approximation

Poisson-Bethe-Aldous-Galton-Watson-Erdös-Renyilattice/graph/process



Edge-costs from uniform distribution on $[0, \lambda]$


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 $F(x) = P(Bob's payoff \ge x)$ in the truncated game


$$F\mapsto \exp\left(-\int_{-x}^{\lambda/2}F(t)\,dt\right).$$

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
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
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P(Bob's payoff \geq x) in the truncated game (\lambda = 5)
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
 $P(Bob's payoff \ge x)$ in the truncated game ($\lambda = 5$)



 $P(Bob's payoff \ge x)$ in the truncated game ($\lambda = 5$)




 $P(Bob's payoff \ge x)$ in the truncated game ($\lambda = 5$)



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
Games, optimization and phase transitions


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



Johan Wästlund


Games, optimization and phase transitions














Johan Wästlund Games, optimization and phase transitions

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Theorem

$$E|Payoff_{k+1} - Payoff_k| \leq \frac{\lambda e^{\lambda}}{k}.$$

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Easy to solve for the fixed point:

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Easy to solve for the fixed point:

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gives

$$F(x)=\frac{1+q}{1+e^{(1+q)x}},$$

where


$$\lambda = \frac{-2\log q}{1+q}.$$

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Cost of the diluted matching problem

 Average cost per vertex (from Alice's first move):

$$\int_0^1 \min\left(\lambda/2, \frac{-\log t}{1+t}\right) dt$$




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
Cost of the diluted matching problem

 Average cost per vertex (from Alice's first move):

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• Limit cost as $\lambda \to \infty$:

$$\int_0^1 \frac{-\log t}{1+t} \, dt = \frac{\pi^2}{12}.$$



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Proof of convergence, numerical values for limit costs

Problem	Limit cost	Pseudo-dim 2
Matching	$\pi^2/12 pprox 0.8224670336$	0.57175904959888
TSP	2.04154818642	1.285153753372032
Edge Cover	$W(1) + rac{1}{2}W(1)^2 pprox 0.7279690463$	0.55872

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